and some vague feeling that there is something important, somewhere, in all of it.Īlso: a quotation from Kimhi, from 1995. I think they give a good impression of the course so far: a whole slew of. He changed it to "cannot breath and drink at the same time", which is at least closer to true.) I've polished them up only slightly, for readability. He retracted it when it was pointed out that they can in fact do that. (A more recent class had "humans cannot eat and drink at the same time". I'd already typed up my notes for the first class (weeks ago, right after it got out) I have put them under the fold. I have been sitting in on the course (we had our sixth meeting this afternoon) it is wild. It started off like something you understood, and then it suddenly got weird, and then. When looking at courses for the coming quarter last December, the consensus was that this paragraph was totally incomprehensible. We shall consider the implications active conceptions of thoughts to our understanding of the nature of the soul and of Being. We present a conception of active thoughts which is not susceptible to the Fregean objections against the traditional conception. Yet we shall that by accepting them as conclusive modernist philosophy took a wrong turn. On the face of it, the considerations Frege brought against the pre-modernist conception were strong. Thus according the post Fregean understanding a person-a soul is logicaly speaking, non-active substance. Frege according to this widely accepted narrative had discredit this pre-modernist picture and gave us an act-free conception of logical unity of thoughts. The pre-modernist saw the inner composition of thoughts as displaying an intellectual act. A widely accepted historical narrative celebrates the liberation achived by the modernist Fregean understanding of predication from the Aristotelian pre-modernist conceptions. Ultimately, Kimhi’s work elucidates the essential sameness of thinking and being that has exercised Western philosophy since its inception.Here is a description from the UChicago time schedule from this quarter: 51603. Self-consciousness, language, and logic are revealed to be but different sides of the same reality. In closing the gap that Frege opened, Kimhi shows that the two principles of non-contradiction-the ontological principle and the psychological principle-are in fact aspects of the very same capacity, differently manifested in thinking and being.Īs his argument progresses, Kimhi draws on the insights of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein to develop highly original accounts of topics that are of central importance to logic and philosophy more generally. Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being marks a radical break with Frege’s legacy in analytic philosophy, exposing the flaws of his approach and outlining a novel conception of judgment as a two-way capacity. Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction-that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought-those that explicate how we in fact think-must be distinguished from logical laws of thought-those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking.
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